The Horn of Africa Needs a Peaceful Transition Beyond Abiy Ahmed

The confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is becoming a test of whether the Horn of Africa can stop another devastating war before it spreads. At the center of this crisis stands Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His approach to relations with neighbouring countries deserves scrutiny, particularly where ambitions for regional influence collide with their sovereignty.

The argument for a peaceful change of leadership in Addis Ababa is becoming harder to dismiss. A region already burdened by Sudan’s war, Somalia’s insecurity, and the consequences of Ethiopia’s own internal conflicts cannot afford another confrontation driven by territorial ambitions and threats of force.

Ethiopia’s formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council alleges that Eritrean troops have advanced 60 kilometres into northern Tigray. Addis Ababa says it has “no other option but to defend itself.”

Eritrea’s information minister, Yemane Gebremeskel, has responded by describing Ethiopia’s accusations as “audacity and duplicity in their most extreme forms.” His response accuses Abiy’s government of pursuing an “unprovoked war of aggression against Eritrea for more than three years.”

These are competing accusations. Neither government’s language, by itself, establishes what has happened on the ground. What the exchange does reveal is how far relations have deteriorated since the 2018 peace agreement raised hopes of ending decades of hostility.

Asmara’s central allegation concerns Ethiopia’s intentions towards the Red Sea. Eritrea accuses Addis Ababa of using the confrontation as a pretext to seize sovereign territory, particularly the port of Assab. It also alleges that Ethiopia is hosting and financing groups seeking to overthrow the Eritrean government.

Those allegations place Abiy’s regional policy at the heart of the dispute. Ethiopia’s need for reliable access to maritime trade is understandable. Turning that economic need into a claim over a neighbour’s territory would be an entirely different proposition, with consequences extending far beyond the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.

Commercial access can be negotiated. Ports can be used through agreements. Regional trade can expand without borders being redrawn. Any suggestion that Ethiopia’s size or economic needs entitle it to impose terms on smaller neighbours makes cooperation more difficult and confrontation more likely.

Somalia has its own reasons to view Ethiopian ambitions with suspicion. Ethiopia’s history of military intervention has left deep mistrust. Abiy’s 2024 memorandum with Somaliland over access to the coast intensified the dispute with Mogadishu, which rejected the arrangement as an infringement of Somali sovereignty.

The regional concern is therefore broader than the latest exchange with Eritrea. When decisions taken in Addis Ababa repeatedly provoke disputes over sovereignty, Ethiopia’s leadership becomes a central source of instability rather than a reliable partner in resolving it.

Sudan adds another urgent dimension. Its war has already inflicted immense suffering and placed pressure on neighbouring countries. Ethiopia, like every other outside power, should be judged by whether its actions help end that conflict or prolong it. Any involvement in supporting armed actors at the expense of a political settlement would deepen a crisis the region cannot contain indefinitely.

Responsibility for every conflict cannot be placed on one government. Eritrean leaders remain accountable for their decisions, Sudan’s belligerents for theirs, and Somali actors for theirs. But that does not absolve Abiy of responsibility for policies that increase mistrust and make regional cooperation harder.

Nor should the international response focus only on managing each new confrontation. Temporary restraint will achieve little if the political approach producing these crises remains unchanged.

A peaceful transition away from Abiy’s leadership should therefore become part of the debate about the region’s future. That change must come through an Ethiopian political process, with Ethiopians determining their government. It should not become a justification for foreign military intervention or another destructive struggle for power.

War is not inevitable. Decisions can still change its course. But a leadership that repeatedly treats confrontation as an instrument of policy makes peace increasingly difficult to sustain.

The Horn of Africa needs an Ethiopian government willing to pursue prosperity through negotiated access, stable borders and dependable relationships with its neighbours. The case for Abiy’s departure rests on whether his continued leadership can deliver that change. His regional record gives little reason for confidence.